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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of current vibration methods used to identify the health of helicopter 
transmission gears. The gears are critical to the transmission system that provides propulsion, lift and maneuvering 
of the helicopter. This paper reviews techniques used to process vibration data to calculate conditions indicators 
(CI’s), guidelines used by the government aviation authorities in developing and certifying the Health and Usage 
Monitoring System (HUMS), condition and health indicators used in commercial HUMS, and different methods 
used to set thresholds to detect damage. Initial assessment of a method to set thresholds for vibration based condition 
indicators applied to flight and test rig data by evaluating differences in distributions between comparable 
transmissions are also discussed. Gear condition indicator FM4 values are compared on an OH58 helicopter during 
14 maneuvers and an OH58 transmission test stand during crack propagation tests. Preliminary results show the 
distributions between healthy helicopter and rig data are comparable and distributions between healthy and damaged 
gears show significant differences. 
I. Introduction 
Helicopter transmission integrity is important to helicopter safety because helicopters depend on the power train 
for propulsion, lift, and flight maneuvering. A study of 1168 helicopter accidents from 1990 to 1996 found that after 
human-factors related causes of accidents, the next most frequent causes of accidents were due to various system 
and structural failures.1 In 1999, of the world total of 192 turbine helicopter accidents, 28 were directly due to 
mechanical failures with the most common in the drive train of the propulsion system.2 Liu and Pines3 continued the 
study performed by NASA from 1998 to 2004. Their study showed the number of accidents caused by vehicle 
factors compared to the total number of accidents have been reduced by more than one half from earlier accident 
data. Pilot error continues to be the major cause of all rotorcraft accidents and failure or malfunction of the 
propulsion system remains the primary reason for vehicle factor related accidents. In order to reduce helicopter 
accidents, the original study1 recommended the design of HUMS capable of predicting impending equipment failure 
for on-condition maintenance, and more advanced systems capable of warning pilots of imminent equipment failure. 
In order to make these predictions, the system must provide health monitoring of the transmission components and 
must also demonstrate a high level of reliability to minimize false alarms. 
Figure 1 shows the potential economic and safety benefits of diagnostics and predictive maintenance of critical 
mechanical systems. If usage is more severe than design life of a component, health monitoring will provide a safety 
benefit. If usage is less severe, the service life of critical components may be extended. Although commercially 
available HUMS provide safety benefits when installed on rotorcraft, the damage detection rate of today’s helicopter  
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Figure 1.—Economic and Safety Benefits of Diagnostics and Prognostics.40 
 
health monitoring systems through vibration analysis can be improved. HUMS experience documented by the 
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in 1997, and informally updated in 2002, shows a success rate of 
70 percent in detecting defects.4 
The following challenges still need to be addressed to achieve the safety and economic potential of an 
integrated health monitoring system:5 
 
• Limited helicopter vibration fault data. 
• Diagnostic tool operational constraints are undefined. 
• Systems complex—Experts required for data analysis. 
• Decision-making on system health difficult. 
• Standard thresholds for types/levels of damage are not clearly defined. 
• Performance assessment methods have not been developed. 
• Tradeoffs between fault detection and false alarms. 
These challenges must be addressed at the subsystem level prior to development of an overall integrated 
helicopter health monitoring system. 
This paper will provide an overview of current vibration based methods used to identify gear component 
damage in commercial HUMS. The standard techniques used to process vibration data and calculate vibration 
algorithms to detect gear damage will be discussed first. Then a brief overview of the guidelines provided by the 
FAA and CAA in developing and certifying HUMS will be provided. Next, the vibration condition and health 
indicators used in commercial HUMS will be discussed including results of a survey sent to several manufacturers. 
Then, different methods used to set thresholds to detect damage will be outlined. Initial assessment of a method to 
set thresholds applied to flight and test rig data will be discussed. 
II. Gear Diagnostic Algorithms  
Numerous diagnostic techniques have been developed from vibration data to detect damage and abnormal 
conditions of the dynamic mechanical components in rotorcraft propulsion systems. A majority of the technology 
developed focused on the gear health. Using vibration data collected from gearbox accelerometers, algorithms are 
developed to detect when gear damage has occurred. Other areas addressed include bearings and driveshafts of the 
main transmission system. This work will focus on vibration algorithms available in commercial HUMS used to 
detect gear damage. 
Gear damage produces changes in the vibration signatures measured by accelerometers installed on the gearbox. 
Over the past 25 years, numerous vibration-based algorithms for mechanical component damage detection in 
transmissions have been developed. The traditional methods of vibration based gear feature detection and extraction 
methods in rotating equipment, discussed in detail by,6 are typically based on some statistical measurement of 
vibration energy. The primary differences are based on which of the characteristic frequencies are included, 
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excluded, or used as a reference. Figure 2 is a block diagram of the steps required to calculate FM4 (Figure of Merit 
4), a common vibration algorithm used in commercial HUMS. 
Referring to figure 2, once the vibration time series data is collected from the accelerometers, the first step to 
define the gear vibration algorithm is to calculate the time synchronous average (TSA) of the data. Gears produce 
vibration signals synchronous with speed. Noise in the vibration signal is reduced using time synchronous 
averaging. Synchronous averaging refers to techniques for extracting periodic waveforms from additive noise by 
averaging vibration signals over several revolutions of the shaft.7 The typical signal time synchronous average is 
obtained by taking the average of the signal in the time domain. Using the once per revolution signal, the vibration 
signal is interpolated into a fixed number of points per shaft revolution. The number of interpolated points are 
typically a power of two (512, 1024, etc.). This makes implementing frequency domain signal processing techniques 
significantly easier. The desired signal, which is synchronous with the shaft speed, will intensify relative to the non-
periodic signals. It should be noted that sample rates of the vibration time series data determines the number of 
averages that can be obtained for the time synchronous averaging. The vibration data is also filtered with a low band 
pass anti-aliasing filter prior to data acquisition to prevent aliasing caused when the sample rate is less than twice the 
bandwidth of the input signal.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.—Flowchart for calculating standard vibration algorithms FM4. 
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After the accelerometer data is sampled and time synchronous averaged to shaft speed, the time domain data is 
converted to frequency domain data using a fast Fourier transform. The amount of filtering is defined by the 
algorithm. FM4 (Figure of Merit 4) was developed to detect changes in the vibration pattern due to damage (pitting, 
small, cracks) on a limited number of teeth.7 For FM4, gear meshing frequency, harmonics, and 1st order sidebands 
are removed from the original signal. This signal is converted back to the time domain. Then a statistical parameter, 
the fourth normalized statistical moment (normalized kurtosis) of the difference signal, is calculated from this data, 
where d is the difference signal, d  is the mean value of the difference signal and N is the total number of 
interpolated points per reading. The kurtosis of a normal distribution equals 3. In theory, for healthy gears, the 
difference signal would be Gaussian noise, resulting in a value of 3. When one or two teeth develop a defect (such as 
a crack or pitting) a peak or series of peaks appears in the difference signal and FM4 reacts by increasing above this 
nominal value of 3. 
III. FAA and CAA HUMS Guidance 
In 1999, the FAA published Advisory Circular (AC) 29–2C, Section MG–15, hereafter referred as the HUMS 
AC.8 The HUMS AC provides guidance for achieving airworthiness approval for installation, credit validation, and 
instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) for a full range of HUMS application. Installation includes all the 
equipment needed for the end-to-end application that is associated with acquiring, storing, processing, and 
displaying the HUMS application data, including airborne and ground-based equipment. Credit validation includes 
evidence of effectiveness for the developed algorithms, acceptance limits, trend setting data, tests, etc., and the 
demonstration methods employed. A plan is needed to ensure continued airworthiness of those parts that could 
change with time or usage and includes the methods used to ensure continued airworthiness. The AC establishes an 
acceptable means, but not the only means of certifying a rotorcraft HUMS. Certification of HUMS addresses the 
complete system, including quality assurance of data produced from the airborne modules of the HUMS, and the 
potential subsequent intervening actions resulting from the ground processing of the airborne data.  
Setting reliable thresholds is related to the credit validation phase of HUMS certification by providing evidence 
of condition indicators effectiveness through reliable threshold limits. In order to obtain maintenance credits, alert 
limits and intervention actions must be defined based on direct evidence of the failure mechanism. If seeded fault 
tests are used to measure the performance of condition indicators, the tests must be verified as representative of 
flight data.  
In 1999, the CAA also came out with Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 693 that provides operators with 
guidelines for installation and use of health monitoring systems. The CAP described the level of monitoring required 
and provided advice on ensuring that the monitoring was effective and reliable. The section on threshold setting and 
adjustment states that thresholds must be defined in the form of absolute signal values, number of standard 
deviations above the mean fleet value, or other means. Trends for indicators that require trend monitoring must also 
be defined. In the threshold changes section it states that changing the limits requires an understanding of the 
relationship between the algorithm values and the increase in the severity of the fault detected based on the history 
of the component.9 
In 2006, the Civil Aviation Authority came out with CAP 753, to provide additional guidance for Operators 
using vibration health monitoring (VHM) in helicopter rotor and drive systems. In this document they define VHM 
as, “the monitoring of vibration data and characteristics that can provide advance information relating to the 
development of incipient failures in the engine(s) rotor drive systems”.10 Gear tooth indicators that can detect gear tooth 
damage and cracks are identified as required indicators. The signal acquisition and processing section of this document 
discusses the importance of sampling rate and signal averaging for VHM. Thresholds, discussed in the alert generation 
and management section of this document, may be set at absolute vibration levels based on fleet experience or learned 
for an individual helicopter. Thresholds can be set as alerts, to indicate inspections, or as alarm to indicate that flights 
should be avoided until maintenance has been performed. The thresholds are dependent on different flight regimes. The 
VHM system is required to detect 70 percent of the failure modes it is designed to monitor. Data must be capable of 
being downloaded within a 10 hour time period. System performance should be evaluated for alert/false alarm rates and 
success/failure rates to detect component damage. 
IV. Commercial HUMS Vibration Algorithms 
An article in Rotor & Wing magazine provided a good overview of commercial HUMS.11 HUMS consist of a 
main computer for data processing and acquisition of in-flight data from accelerometers and tachometers installed on 
critical aircraft components. If the aircraft is equipped with a flight data recorder, the system may also collect data from 
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the recorder. Components that are monitored include the main and tail rotors, their gear boxes and drive trains. 
Vibration data is typically downloaded by a mechanic post flight. The main function is to collect data to identify 
normal and abnormal changes in vibration levels on an aircraft's critical components. Typically the boundaries of 
“normal” performance are identified during flight testing. All commercial HUMS use vibration algorithms for gears 
calculated using the steps discussed in the gear vibration algorithms section of this paper. Threshold configurations can 
be different for each system. Techniques utilized by three HUMS manufacturers are reviewed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The Goodrich Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics Health and Usage Management Systems (IMD-HUMS) 
mechanical diagnostics capabilities include drive train vibration information analyzed in-flight to determine drive train 
health. A number of condition indicators are calculated from vibration data to characterize component health. The 
IMD-HUMS has limit exceedance capabilities on drive train vibration levels for condition indicators (CI) and health 
indicators (HI).12 Condition Indicators (CI) refer to gear vibration algorithm used to reflect the health of the gear, such 
as FM4. Goodrich calculates several CI’s for a component. The U.S. Army and the Goodrich Corporation have 
undertaken a battalion-level demonstration of the Goodrich Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics Health and Usage 
Monitoring System (IMD HUMS). A paper by Wright13 provides an overview of benefits utilizing the automatic 
acquisition of drive train component CI’s. Significant detections have been made to date of problems on the helicopter. 
Comparisons between aircraft are being used to verify and validate some indicators. However, final health limits and 
thresholds are not defined for every component.  
In 1993, the U.S. Navy provided the groundwork for the current Goodrich IMD-HUMS through work on an 
H-60 Helicopter Integrated Diagnostic System (HIDS).12 Flight and ground tests were performed to develop and 
evaluate diagnostic algorithms for the HIDS. Additional work was performed installing the IMD-HUMS on the 
H-53 platform. These programs demonstrate the capabilities of the IMD HUMS as a tool for rotorcraft health 
management and diagnostics. Navy researchers have also performed preliminary research applying multivariate 
statistical process control techniques to produce a single indicator on the state of a system. This technique was 
applied to drive system seeded fault tests with promising results.14 
Intelligent Automation Corporation developed a HUMS system with the U.S. Army under the Vibration 
Management Enhancement Program (VMEP) to monitor the health of drive system dynamic components. The system 
consists of an on-board computer to collect and processes vibration information in flight, ground based software for 
displaying information to maintenance personnel, and web–based infrastructure tools for data archiving and analysis.15 
Data acquisition can be triggered at a specific time or during a specific flight regime. FM4 is one of several algorithms 
used as a condition indicator to threshold or trend for fault diagnostics. Keller16 provides and overview of the drive train 
faults, 4 bearings and 1 shaft, discovered to date in over 70 aircraft equipped with the VMEP system. A database of 
drive train condition indicators has been developed from the data collected to date.  
Smiths Aerospace developed the GenHUMS (Generic HUMS). GenHUMS has been in operational service in 
the UK Chinook fleet since 2000. The GenHUMS also includes powertrain and gearbox diagnostics in their health 
monitoring system. Smiths Aerospace and Bristow Helicopters are also developing a HUMS anomaly detection 
system under support from the CAA because HUMS data has shown that not all defect related trends or changes in 
HUMS data are detected with current threshold setting methods. They provided an example of large crack in a bevel 
pinion of a main gearbox that did not generate alerts from the vibration indicators. The objective of their work is to 
develop a method to identify abnormal behavior by comparing it to a data set of “normal” behavior.17 
Preliminary work was done by Boeing to investigate a method to evaluate diagnostic algorithms and define 
criteria for threshold settings and compiled into a report, “Monitor the Monitors, RITA Metrics Document.” A 
conceptual design of a Graphical User Interface was developed for a tool, but implementation procedures were not 
defined and the tool was never validated due to the limited amount of transmission seeded fault data available for 
assessment of vibration algorithm performance.18 
V. HUMS Survey Results 
A survey was sent to the 3 HUMS manufacturers (Goodrich, Intelligent Automation Corporation, Smiths 
Aerospace) to compare the methods used for identifying drive train component damage. The survey contained the 
following questions related to their systems: 
• Number/locations of sensors (accelerometers, 1X/rev) 
• Time synchronous averaging techniques 
• Vibration algorithms used for gears and bearings 
• Data collection information (frequency, amount, type) 
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• Regime/maneuver recognition 
• Operational constraints 
• Decision making tools using condition indicators (CI’s) 
• System performance and reliability metrics 
 
All three manufactures provided valuable information on the capabilities of their HUMS.19–21 Results of the survey 
indicated commercial HUMS shared many similar traits. The number and location of sensors and time synchronous 
averaging techniques were comparable. The CI’s for drive train components were similar. Data collection rates and 
amount/type of data saved is user selectable. There are some operational constraints regarding data collection during 
stable regimes with minimal transitions. Data collection can be automatic based on specified conditions. Smiths has 
found that data collected in normal cruise conditions at 60 to 70 percent torque provides the best flight regime for 
monitoring gear CI’s. Some systems monitor torque for regime/maneuver recognition but the threshold adjustment 
based on torque varies. Some systems access several parameters in addition to speed and torque such as airspeed, 
altitude, rate of descent that can be correlated with CI’s. Decision making tools using vibration algorithms or condition 
indicators (CI’s) integrated into health indicators (HI’s) are under development by several manufacturers. HI’s provide 
decision making tools for the end user on the status of system health. Overall, CI and HI performance and reliability is 
very difficult to evaluate due to limited failure data available to assess performance. Published CI and HI threshold 
setting methods currently under development by the three manufacturers will be discussed in the next two paragraphs.  
Intelligent Automation Corporation created a tool for developing a standard dataset of CI’s.22 New CI data is 
compared to the standard dataset to determine if the new data fits within the standard data set as normal or a specific 
fault class. Then data is accepted or rejected based on a rejection threshold. If the data is accepted it can be added to 
the standard data set after review by qualified personnel. 
Goodrich is developing proprietary statistical procedures to define sets of threshold for each aircraft type and 
component by modeling the effect of variance across aircraft and torque on transmission components.23 Thresholds 
use a “healthy” data set that spans a subset of the fleet and the operating conditions. Variance for different 
helicopters and torque levels is estimated using a least square estimator, then corrected for small sample by using 
Student’s t-distribution to test for statistical significance between two sample means. Their system is also capable of 
integrating several CI’s into one health indicator (HI) that can be used to identify when a component requires 
additional analysis or a component is faulted.23–25 Fusing CI’s sensitive to a specific failure can minimize the amount 
of information used by end user to make a decision on system health.  
Smiths is currently developing and fielding health indicators (HI) for the end user to easily interpret the system 
health.21 In the past, simple thresholds were identified for condition indicators. More work was performed on 
statistical analysis of CI data distributions. Rule based systems have also been used. Smiths has found that the 
mentioned threshold setting tools may identify classic faults, but cannot identify novel faults that can occur 
50 percent of the time. Using Artificial Intelligence (AI) reasoners, Bayesian statistics, data mining, clustering and 
failure modes and effects analysis models, they have been successful identifying novel, unanticipated faults such as 
sensor failures. They have rerun 6 years of archived data using their anomaly detector HI with promising results. 
This anomaly detection technique will not replace the current HUMS threshold setting methods. Rather, it will 
provide additional capabilities to the current HUMS threshold setting methods.  
VI. Environmental Effects on Vibration Methods 
The usage monitoring piece of the HUMS consists of measuring torque, engine operating hours and flight hours 
to track usage of aircraft. Flight regimes and environmental operating conditions can also be included. The 
sensitivity of the CI’S to environmental effects in varying flight regimes must be taken into consideration when 
setting thresholds. Understanding the significant effects of operating conditions on CI’s is important to defining 
reliable thresholds. Preliminary work has been performed evaluating gear CI’s under varying load, speed and flight 
conditions, but more work is required.26,27 Limited work has been performed verifying that thresholds defined in test 
rigs can classify helicopter transmission health. This is due to limited availability of flight fault data to verify 
damage detection sensitivity demonstrated in test rigs can be maintained in flight in different flight regimes.28,29 
VII. Setting Thresholds 
The goal for setting thresholds to indicate drive train health is to provide the minimum number of false alarms 
while maintaining sensitivity to gear damage. As mentioned in the previous sections, HUMS manufacturers use 
several methods to define thresholds. One of the biggest challenges when defining the threshold or limit of a  
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diagnostic tool is the tradeoff between the sensitivity of the limit to indicate damage and the number of false alarms. 
If a limit is decreased, damage may be detected, but more false alarms may result. If a limit is increased, false alarms 
may decrease, but the algorithms will be less sensitive to damage. Figure 3 illustrates 2 distributions used to 
represent a no damage response and a damage response of a condition indicator. 
Based on the CI value and the health of the component, table 1 provides the results of the decisions made on a 
given CI. Interpreting the overlapping region illustrated in figure 3 is the challenge to setting reliable thresholds 
based on the CI.  
A. Hypothesis Tests 
Figure 3 and table 1 are related to hypothesis tests used in statistical analysis. A hypothesis test is defined by 
testing the value of a population parameter, the null hypothesis, Ho. The alternative hypothesis, H1, is the statement 
that must be true if the null hypothesis is false.  
 
TABLE 1.—RESULTS OF DAMAGE/NO DAMAGE DECISIONS 
Health of component  
No gear damage Gear damage 
Indicate no damage Correct decision Missed hit Decision 
Indicate damage False alarm Correct decision 
 
Table 2 represents the hypothesis parameters for the decisions listed in table 1. The hypothesis is defined to test 
that the mean of the CI from the undamaged gear looks significantly different than the mean of the CI of the 
damaged gear. A test statistic is used to make the decision to reject the null hypothesis based on the probability of 
acceptable error. Referring to table 2, if the null hypothesis is rejected when it is true, this results in Type I error 
(false positive) If you fail to reject the null hypothesis when it is false, this results in Type II error (false negative). 
An earlier analysis of flight data found the mean could vary 3 standard deviations within a healthy set of CI data.29 
The variance within the data must be considered when defining a test statistic to set thresholds to minimize the 
occurrence of false alarms. 
 
TABLE 2.—HYPOTHESIS OF DAMAGE/NO DAMAGE DECISIONS 
True state of system  
Ho is true 
Ho: μ < CI 
Gear is healthy 
Ho is false 
H1: μ > CI 
Gear is damaged 
Reject Ho False alarm  
(Type I error) 
Correct decision Decision 
Fail to reject Ho Correct decision 
Healthy component 
Missed hit  
(Type II error) 
 
B. Bayesian Statistics 
Bayesian inference is another statistical analysis technique that can be used for setting thresholds to make a 
decision on component health. Bayesian inference updates the likelihood of a hypothesis (probability a hypothesis is 
true) given a previous likelihood estimate and additional evidence (observations). Bayesian inference can be used to 
determine the probability that a diagnosis of gear damage is correct given a priori information. An example of an 
equation for Bayesian inference to set damage detection thresholds is: 
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where P(fi /O) equals the probability of fault (fi) given diagnostic output (O), P(O/fi) equals the probability that a 
diagnostic output (O) is observed with fault (fi), and P(fi) is the a priori probability of (fi) occurring.30,31 
Due to limited fault data, it is challenging to apply Bayesian inference to identifying component health. 
Bayesian inference requires knowledge about the diagnostic system to generate the a priori distributions and a 
priori probabilities of the hypotheses. The complexity of the data due to multiple hypotheses (several vibration 
algorithms and damage levels) and multiple conditional dependent events (maneuvers, time dependent data) also 
make it difficult to define levels of probability for each scenario. Bayesian statistics may be useful when applied to 
fault classification, where a large amount of fault data is acquired on different types of faults.32 
C. Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic has been successfully used to set thresholds to identify gear damage and to make a decision on the 
health of the system.28,33 Earlier studies found fuzzy logic, as compared to production rules and neural networks, the 
most robust when monitoring transitional failure data on a gearbox.34 Another study comparing automated reasoning 
techniques for condition-based maintenance found fuzzy logic more flexible than standard logic by making 
allowances for unanticipated behavior.35 Fuzzy logic applies fuzzy set theory to data, where fuzzy set theory is a 
theory of classes with unsharp boundaries. The data belongs in a fuzzy set based on its degree of membership.36 
Fuzzy logic starts with a fuzzy set, extending boolean set theory to a continuous valued logic via the concept of 
membership functions valued between 0 and 1. A membership function is a curve that defines how each point in the 
input space is mapped to a membership value or degree of membership between 0 and 1. The only condition a 
membership function must satisfy is that it is a continuous function that varies between 0 and 1. Once membership 
functions are defined for a fuzzy set, fuzzy rules must be defined. Fuzzy rules are defined by experts in the field. 
Experts express their field knowledge in rules with an IF-THEN format. An example of a fuzzy if-then rule is, “if x 
is A then y is B.” The final step is to convert the fuzzy membership information and rules into a crisp output using 
defuzzification methods. 
Figure 4 is an example of using fuzzy logic to define health indicators from gear condition indicators. Gear 
condition indicators are calculated from sensor data. Membership functions are then developed for the CI’s. 
Defining membership functions that accurately reflect the CI data is the challenge when using fuzzy logic to set 
thresholds. In this example, trapezoidal shaped membership functions were used. A certain amount of overlap is 
required or no rules will fire for values in the gap between the membership functions. The x-axis of the membership 
function refers to the CI values and the y-axis refers to the degree of membership. DL refers to Damage Low (Gear 
O.K), DM refers to Damage Medium (Inspect Gear) and DH refers to Damage High (Shutdown System). The basic 
rules are defined based on the level of damage indicated by the CI and experience with the CI to detect specific 
faults in certain environmental conditions. Membership functions and rules can be added for additional CI’s. The 
degree of membership for the output of the fuzzy model provides the status of gear health. For this example O.K 
indicates no gear damage, Inspect indicates initial pitting and Shutdown (due to damage) indicates destructive 
pitting. The output was defined to give the end user a simple function based on the state of the gear. A value of 0 to 
0.33 indicates the gear is O.K., 0.33 to 0.66 indicates the gear should be inspected, and 0.66 to 1.0 indicates 
shutdown the system, the gear is damaged. 
D. Relative Frequency Plots 
Preliminary research was performed comparing probability distributions of CI’s from a GRC spur gear 
component rig with and without gear damage and flight data from an OH58 helicopter under normal conditions.29 
Histograms of the CI values were created for CI’s measured in the test rig with and without damage and the CI’s 
measured on a helicopter during several maneuvers. In order to compare the histograms with probability 
distributions, relative frequency plots were created scaling the histograms so that the area under the curve was equal 
to 1. The relative frequency plots of the flight data were similar to the curves for NASA Glenn Research Center 
(GRC) component test rig data without gear damage. Distributions of the data also changed when damage occurred. 
This earlier work compared the data from helicopter flights to a simple test rig consisting of 2 meshing spur gears. In 
order to evaluate if differences in distributions are observed between comparable helicopter and test rig 
transmissions work has begun to evaluate the difference in distributions between flight data and a comparable 
transmission test stand. The next section will provide preliminary data to demonstrate this analysis. 
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Figure 4.—Setting threshold from CI’s using fuzzy logic. 
VIII. Setting CI Thresholds on OH58 Flight and Test Data 
Figure 5 illustrates the OH58 helicopter used to collected healthy CI data from accelerometers located on the 
transmission housing.37,38 For this analysis, only one accelerometer mounted horizontally and radial to the 
transmission will be discussed. No mechanical component damage was observed during flights. Data was collected 
from 14 different maneuvers each repeated 12 times. The maneuvers and average torque level during the maneuver 
are shown in table 3. The pilot set-up the maneuver, then collected data for 34 sec. The component monitored for 
health was the main transmission 19 tooth input spiral bevel gear pinion. Vibration data was sampled at a rate of 
50 kHz with an anti-aliasing filter set at 18 kHz. For each 34-second maneuver, 48 time synchronous averages were 
calculated with 71 rotations in each average. In addition to vibration, torque and speed were also measured. The 
pinion was run at an average speed of 6278 rpm. 
 
TABLE 3.—OH58 FLIGHT MANEUVERS 
Man Torque, 
percent 
Maneuver description Man Torque, 
percent 
Maneuver description 
A 55 Level, forward ~55 percent torque H 74 Hover, ~10 ft 
B 80 Level, forward ~80 percent torque I 74 Hover ~10 ft, turn left 
C 58 Level, sideways left J 73 Hover ~10 ft, turn right 
D 58 Level sideways right K 61 20° bank left turn 
E 55 Climb, ~55 percent torque L 61 20° bank right turn 
F 15 Descent, ~15 percent torque M 80 Climb, ~80 percent torque 
G 26 Flat pitch on ground N 35 Descent, 35 percent torque 
 
 
 
 
Membership Functions 
CI’s: FM4, NA4, Debris  
Gear Health 
Inspect 
Shutdown 
O.K. 
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Figure 5.—OH58 helicopter. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.—OH58 Relative frequency plots of FM4 from NASA Ames OH58 flight tests. 
 
Figure 6 shows the relative frequency plots for condition indicator FM4 from an accelerometer installed on the 
transmission housing during NASA Ames OH58 Flight Tests. For this data, histograms were created from the FM4 
CI data for each maneuver with a bin width of 0.05 and a range of 1 to 8.5. The histogram data was then rescaled so 
the area under the curve (integral under the estimated distribution) is equal to 1 by dividing the counts by the bin 
size and total number of readings (counts/(readings*bin size). Although the minimum FM4 value for this 
accelerometer across all maneuvers was 1.87 and the maximum was 4.92, the majority of values fall within 2 and 3. 
The distributions varied for each maneuver and the tails of the distributions shift to the right for higher torque levels, 
with the maximum FM4 value observed during maneuver B, 80 percent torque. The changes in the distribution for 
each maneuver shows that FM4 is effected by operational conditions. 
Figure 7 illustrates the NASA GRC OH58 Helicopter Transmission Test Stand used to collect healthy and 
damaged CI data from accelerometers located on the transmission housing during a matrix of pinion crack 
propagation tests.39 The main transmission 19 tooth spiral bevel pinion gear, like the helicopter, was monitored for 
health. And, for this preliminary analysis, only one accelerometer mounted horizontally and radial to the 
transmission will be discussed. For these tests, a pinion tooth was notched and run several hours to facilitate a tooth 
fracture. In addition to vibration, torque and speed were also measured. The pinion was run at design speed of 
6060 rpm for all tests. Torque values ranged from 80 to 150 percent torques. Vibration data was sampled at a rate of 
150 kHz with an anti-aliasing filter set at 56 kHz. Data was sampled every 15 sec for a 1.5 sec duration. Time 
synchronous averages were calculated with 150 rotations in each average.  
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Figure 7.—NASA GRC OH58 Transmission test stand. 
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Figure 8.—Relative frequency plots of FM4 from NASA GRC OH58 Transmission test stand. 
Figure 8 shows the relative frequency plots for condition indicator FM4 from an accelerometer installed on the 
transmission housing of the NASA GRC OH58 Test Stand. The pinion was run for 60.5 hr at 150 percent torque 
with an initial notch fabricated on one tooth of the pinion. The notch was then deepened and the pinion ran an 
additional 5.5 hr at 120 percent torque, 1.34 hr at 140 percent torque, then 0.2 hr at 150 percent torque and inspected 
several times within each torque cycle. A 60X microscope was used for visually inspecting the gear. It was known 
that no crack initiation occurred prior to the deepening of the notch. Crack initiation was also not observed after 
running at 140 percent torque. At completion of the test at 150 percent torque a tooth was found to be fractured. A 
picture of the tooth is shown in figure 9. For this data, histograms were created from the FM4 CI data at different 
torque levels (120, 140, and 150 percent) with a bin width of 0.05 and a range of 1 to 8.5. The histogram data was 
also rescaled so the area under the curve is equal to 1 by dividing the counts by the bin size and total number of 
readings (counts/(readings*bin size). Note that the majority of values fall within 2.5 and 4.5 for the data sets with 
the healthy pinion. The distribution of the data shifts to 4.5 to 6.0 for the data set with the damaged pinion. 
Additional work is required applying threshold setting methods discussed in the previous section to this data set 
and additional data from both the helicopter and the transmission test stand. 
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Figure 9.—Pinion cracked tooth at test completion. 
IX. Summary 
This paper provided an overview of guidelines used by the FAA and CAA in developing and certifying HUMS, 
the techniques used to process vibration data to calculate conditions indicators (CI’s), condition and health 
indicators used in commercial HUMS, and different methods used to set thresholds to detect damage. Initial 
assessment of a method to set thresholds applied to flight and test rig data was presented. Gear condition indicator 
FM4 distribution values on a healthy OH58 helicopter and a health OH58 transmission test rig were comparable. On 
the helicopter, distributions varied for each maneuver and the tails of the distributions shifted to the right (FM4 
values increased) for higher torque levels. Distributions between healthy and damaged gears on the test rig showed 
significant differences, shifting to the right (FM4 values increased) with increased damage. 
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